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Martin Loughlin. The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford 





On the understanding of some, the United Kingdom has no constitution. The absence 
of a written constitution troubles those who look for certitude in things settled and, 
with the exception of some so-called constitutional statutes thought now too important 
to repeal, nothing within the British constitution is settled because everything is liable 
to change. On this understanding, the United Kingdom has what may be called 
“politics without a constitution”—nothing (or, rather, too little) binds the various 
constitutional actors in their undertakings and relations with each other. Compounded 
by the doctrines of parliamentary sovereignty and government dominion over 
Parliament, it is thought that nothing is permanent because change, even radical 
change, is all too possible. On this view, the activity of constitutional actors is the 
pursuit of a purely empirical activity—it is, simply, “what happens” in the pursuit of 
wants and desires. It is not, for that reason, an inconsequential activity, but it is 
quickly dismissed as “politics”, with the many sinister connotations associated with 
the term. The United Kingdom has politics, but not a constitution, and anything goes. 
 
On the briefest inspection, this understanding of the British constitution is difficult to 
sustain. The various constitutional actors do not awake each morning with the “blank 
sheet of infinite possibility” laid before them.
1
 They do not pursue their wants and 
desires (if that is what they are best understood as doing) without direction. They 
understand that certain things are the “done things” and certain others the “not done 
things”. What the first understanding of the constitution is missing is an account of 
what sets politics to work; that is, why, despite the claim that just anything can 
happen, politics does not surprise us every day. So what, then, guides the activity of 
constitutional actors? On one view, the “done thing” is the pursuit of principle or a 
programme of principles; the “not done thing” the frustration of that pursuit. These 
principles precede political activity so as to set it to work. They supply in advance of 
such activity ends to be pursued—peace, order, good government; economic stability; 
social equality—and set empirical activity to work by cabining politics within a 
constitution. The United Kingdom has, on this view, a constitution—it is not written, 
but it is what guides constitutional actors, just as written constitutions in other places 
and at other times have guided political activity there and then. 
 
Understanding the British constitution as politics within a constitution of principles is 
more plausible than understanding it as politics without a constitution. It is, after all, 
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familiar to hear constitutional actors—Prime Minister, Secretary of State, Lord 
Justice, Speaker—appeal to principles to account for what they do and refrain from 
doing. Yet, despite this difference with the first understanding, this second 
understanding of the British constitution builds on the first, for it, too, looks upon 
political activity as without compass and dependent on some external force to 
motivate its direction. It shares with the first understanding the thought that anything 
can happen, but seeks to respond to the risk. Principles precede political activity and 
the latter is to be in the service of principles. 
 
These two understandings and their permutations within public law thought suggests 
that it is difficult to understand political activity otherwise than as the pursuit of desire 
or principles. The special burden carried by Martin Loughlin in The British 
Constitution: A Very Short Introduction is to interrogate another understanding of 
political activity and constitution. This alternative understanding of the British 
constitution is only partially developed in opposition to the other two. There will be 
times when activity within the Palace of Westminster—Loughlin’s primary, though by 
no means exclusive focus
2
—may well warrant appeals to the pursuit of desire or 
principle, but to suppose that this is true of all such activity is to deny an 
understanding of political activity within the British constitution that is not the pursuit 
of principle or want, but rather a critically reflective understanding of “the done” and 
“the not done” things. On this view, to understand the British constitution is to 
understand political activity in a way that resists divorcing it from the constitution—
that is, in a way that invites an understanding of politics as not quite without or within 
but, in important respects, as the British constitution.  
 
To develop this idea, this review essay explores Loughlin’s invitation to study the 
British constitution historically, an invitation that pays special attention to evolving 
relationships between constitutional actors and the practices inherent to those 
relationships. This understanding resists attempts to reduce such relationships to 
simple propositions as to what is done and not done; rather, it invites one to appreciate 
the debt of such propositions to the historical practices they account for. It follows 
that, as the practices change, so too will the constitution, which is not to say that the 
constitution is without identity. The invitation is to orient the study of the constitution 
to its traditions of behaviour and to see within them the exercise of practical judgment.  
 
To interrogate this understanding of the constitution, this essay draws on Walter 
Bagehot, F.W. Maitland, Ivor Jennings, and others—writers who situated the 
changing practices of the constitution at the forefront of their accounts. Jennings 
would write, in the preface to his Cabinet Government, that it is “the accumulation of 
precedents, each with its different environment, which enables one to say what, in new 
circumstances, ought to be done; and the precedent which proves most useful is often 
not the ‘leading case’ but the case which at first sight seems relatively unimportant”.
3
 
My aim in drawing on these writers is not to present their accounts of the constitution, 
but rather to present an understanding of the constitution within their style, a style 
combining political activity and constitution. It is significant that, to situate 
Loughlin’s account of the constitution, this essay appeals to scholars of days past. The 
thesis of this “very short introduction” to the British constitution is captured by its 
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closing chapter’s title: “Whiter the constitution?”. The question mark suggests a more 
tentative reading than the balance of the book warrants—as Loughlin puts it in the 
book’s first pages: “during the modern era the British constitution has veered from 
being a major source of pride to an arrangement that provokes dissatisfaction” (at_xi). 
The British Constitution does not seek to praise, but rather seeks to understand the 
present state of malaise. To this reader, it reads like a eulogy for a constitution that 
was, one that is not only to be understood historically, but that may now be relegated 
to history. To understand why requires an appreciation for Loughlin’s special 
reference to traditions of behaviour and how they bind and evolve and, also, how they 
whither. 
 
2. An evolution of decline 
 
To write about the British constitution is a treacherous affair. Many of the giants 
referred to by Loughlin prefaced their own study by dismissing previous attempts to 
capture the constitution. A.V. Dicey, for example, introduced his treatise on The Law 
of the Constitution by rejecting William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England, which he described as having “but one fault”, namely: “the statements it 
contains are the direct opposite of the truth”.
4
 So, too, do we find in Bagehot’s 1867 
collection of essays on The English Constitution the reflection that “an observer who 
looks at the living reality [of the constitution] will wonder at the contrast to the paper 
description” for “[h]e will see in the life much which is not in the books” and, in turn, 
will not find “in the rough practice” many of the “refinements” of theory.
5
 In 
Maitland’s 1908 Constitutional History of England, we are warned how “the more we 
study our constitution whether in the present or the past, the less do we find it conform 
to any such plan as a philosopher might invent in his study”.
6
 And, again, in the 
scholarship of John Griffith we find despair in how the “theory of the Constitution is 
full of ghosts striving to entangle us with their chains”.
7
 Loughlin himself has not 
shied away from such critical evaluations of constitutional scholarship: in his review 
of Adam Tomkins’ Our Republican Constitution,
8
 he would deplore that “the 




To write even a very short introduction to the British constitution is therefore no small 
feat. How, then, to undertake the task? There are, for Loughlin, two general ways in 
which the British have sought to capture their constitution. Before the 20th century, 
works on the constitution “were mainly works of history” (at 24), attempts to capture 
the workings of the British constitution that, in the estimation of scholars past, was 
“matchless”.
10
 The attempt to describe Britain’s constitutional arrangements should 
not be taken to imply the absence of ambition. Given the view that the constitution 
was “the inheritance of a long tradition in the practical art of governing”, 
constitutional understanding was to be acquired “through experience” and could not 
be “easily expressed in books or conveyed through formal instruction” (at 23). Any 
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description risked misrepresentation, either in its selection of constitutional materials 
or in its attempted summary of matters selected for inclusion. And yet, the task was 
important: both domestic and foreign scholars attempted to “unlock the secret of the 
constitution” that, unlike other European systems of government, had “managed to 
make the transition to modernity without undergoing violent revolution” (at 24).  
 
That the British constitution was considered to have any virtue come as a surprise to 
some. After all, having been not so much made as “stumbled upon”, it is, said 
Bagehot, “full of every species of incidental defect” and “of the worst 
workmanship”.
11
 And yet, despite these failings, so many political developments of 
good government are owed to it. Among those developments are the Westminster 
model of parliamentary government and the efficient secret that keeps executive and 
legislature in agreement;
12
 an impartial and permanent civil service, said to be “the 
one great political invention in nineteenth-century England”;
13
 and a Loyal 
Opposition, whereby a party out of power is not only tolerated but encouraged to 
challenge the government and to appeal for support between and at general elections 




What was the secret that allowed for these developments? No less an Anglophile than 
Charles de Gaulle, speaking in Westminster in April 1960, would surmise that, even if 
the British lacked “meticulously worked out constitutional texts”, “by virtue of an 
unchallengeable general consent, they find the means, on each occasion, to ensure 
the efficient functioning of democracy without incurring excessive criticism of the 
ambitious”.
15
 As we will see, that sense of “general consent” animates Loughlin’s 
account of the constitution and its traditions of behaviour, although it is no longer one 
that can be said to be as “unchallengeable” in the present as it was in the not so distant 
past. 
 
Since the 20th century, constitutional scholarship is no longer concerned with 
description and it has “become almost impossible to write about the British 
constitution without explicitly advocating the need for reform” (at 39). The British 
pride and foreign jealousy in Britain’s constitutional arrangements have been 
abandoned and in their place have arisen the two understandings of the constitution 
with which this essay began. Foreigners and citizens now question whether the British 
even have a constitution and seek to cabin political activity by appealing to a 
programme of principles. Loughlin reports that, “constitutionally speaking”, the 
British “are living through a period of considerable uncertainty” (at 7). What was once 
the source of British constitutional success—“the idea of a constitution that has grown 
organically in response to economic, political, and social changes”—is now said to be 
“rather puzzling” (at 1). The customary constitution, one based on traditions of 
behaviour that bind even as they evolve, “has become so corroded that it no longer 
provides a coherent account of the nature of British government” (at 116). The 
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writings on the British constitution today all read, for Loughlin, as blueprints for 
reform, unconcerned with history except to overcome it. The “politics of repair” that 
animated traditions of behaviour have been replaced “by that of destruction and 
creation” following the loss of direction offered by those traditions (at 108). 
 
In contrast to both the pre- and the post-20th century writings on the constitution, 
Loughlin’s account is neither a work of history nor a programme for reform. Instead, 
he seeks to capture the malaise in the current state of constitutional affairs. The 
trajectory of the book as a whole and of each one of its chapters is to report a decline, 
in confidence and in sense of direction. In his review of parliamentary government 
(ch. 3), Loughlin charts the historical rise of Parliament in its representative function 
as an instrument for taxation, through to the assertion of its plenipotentiary power 
under Henry VIII in breaking with the Holy See in Rome, establishing a new religion 
for England, and affirming parliamentary sovereignty in the constitutional settlement 
of the 17th century. The conflicts between “crown and Parliament were replaced in the 
18th century by tensions within Parliament itself” (at 52), as political factions turned 
parties vied for control of government. From the high water mark of Parliament’s 
supreme jurisdiction, Loughlin charts its decline in legislative authority (yielded to the 
government: “since the 19th century, Parliament has rarely made any major impact 
on the content of legislation” at 57), in ministerial authority (yielded to the civil 
service: “this is the “efficient secret” of the contemporary constitution” at 61), and 
in the rise of the party machinery (“governmental decisions are now made through 
party mechanisms rather than in accordance with received constitutional 
understandings” at 62). Parliament’s one “saving feature” is said by Loughlin to be 
its ability to test “Ministers through debates, questions, and other forms of scrutiny” 
(at 64).  
 
A similar arc of rise and decline animates the historical review of the “expansion and 
contraction of the English state” (ch. 4). The expansion of the English state to Wales 
and then Scotland and then Ireland, coupled with the Empire-building ambitions of 
“Greater Britain”, reached their apex late into the 19th century. The story since has 
been the loss of Empire, the Ireland Act 1920, and the Statute of Westminster 1931, to 
name but some of the markers of decline, all of which put the European Communities 
Act 1972 and the devolution measures of 1998 in a less distinguished light. Loughlin’s 
review of this rise and fall frames his account why none of the modern concepts of 
“state”, “nation”, and “citizen” “easily fits the British experience” (at 83). His review 
of citizenship captures well the currently confused state of mind. The traditional 
incidents of citizenship—the rights to vote, to stand for election, and to work in the 
civil service—are given not only to British citizens, but also “to citizens of the 
Republic of Ireland and the British Commonwealth”, with the former, but not the 
latter, also having a right of abode (at 85). Remnants of Greater Britain remain even in 
a less confident Kingdom. 
 
The third substantive chapter—on civil liberty (ch. 5)—recounts a similar narrative of 
loss. It begins with the affirmation of civil liberty, a Hobbesian concept of freedom 
from law, guaranteed not by formal declarations but by a watchful Parliament, trial by 
jury, and the strict construction of statutes by the common law judges. The great 
“landmark documents”—the Magna Carta 1215, the Petition of Right 1628, and the 
Bill of Rights 1689—are reported to have “conferred no new rights”, but instead to 
have “merely restated their existence” (at 87), thereby affirming how liberty is 
 6 
ingrained in a tradition and way of being. The canonical statement capturing this deep 
commitment to liberty is Dicey’s third sense of the rule of law, which affirms that the 
law of the constitution is “not the source but the consequence of the rights of 
individuals”,
16
 meaning that the freedom of the individual is not deduced from a 
declaration of rights so much as induced from “various court rulings on personal 
rights” (at 90). The price of liberty, on this account, is “eternal vigilance”, by 
Parliament and by the courts (at 91). That vigilance has not been unwavering. 
Loughlin finds fault with both Parliament and the judiciary. The 20th century marked 
not only an expansion of legal regulation, but also of administration and discretion, all 
of which challenged traditional understandings of the scope of parliamentary and 
judicial jurisdiction. The result has been a decline in traditional understandings of civil 
liberty, replaced with “human rights”, adopted “off-the-peg” (at 107) from the 
European Convention on Human Rights and understood to be, contra Dicey, “not the 
consequence but the source” of the rights of individuals. In the place of a watchful 
Parliament has arisen an increasingly watchful and confident judiciary, making claims 
of a “common law constitution” and a concomitant “shift away from constitutional 
protection of civil liberty by way of parliamentary restraint and strict judicial 
construction towards a framework in which the judiciary perform a leading role as 
guardian of enumerated rights” (at 103). Parliament’s decline continues. 
 
Nowhere in The British Constitution does Loughlin purport to identify a single cause 
for this decline and loss of self-understanding. Several possible causes are suggested 
in passing—among them, a loss of “club government” (at 36), “the institutionalization 
of ideological politics” (at 36), “the emergence of party discipline as a key 
determinant of political conduct” (at 36), and “a general sense of decline in political 
conduct” (at 40)—but none is awarded pride of place in Loughlin’s interpretation. 
Rather, one orienting theme of the book is the loss of the constitution’s traditions of 
behaviour and their haphazard and tentative substitution with a rational programme of 
modernization. The outcome is neither promising nor uplifting for Loughlin, who 
concludes the book on this melancholy note: “as one chapter of constitutional 
development draws to a close, we look forward with a mixture of anxiety and 
anticipation to the prospect of reading the new” (at 118). 
 
To understand the loss that Loughlin attempts to capture, a sense of traditions of 
behaviour must be appealed to. Michael Oakeshott, identified by Loughlin as “the 
20th-century philosopher who did most to explain the constitutional implications” of 
the (now declining) British pragmatic, anti-rationalist temperament (at 19), offers the 
account of such traditions alive in The British Constitution, a debt acknowledged by 
Loughlin in writing that the rise of rationalism “has distorted the legacy of the 




3. Traditions of behaviour 
 
                                               
16
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FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC LAW (2010). 
 7 
A “tradition of behaviour is a tricky thing to get to know”, reported Oakeshott in his 
inaugural lecture as Professor of Political Science at the London School of 
Economics.
18
 This is true of all traditions of behaviour—“the Christian religion, 
modern physics, the game of cricket, shipbuilding”—and is no less true of that 
tradition which Oakeshott invited his reader to reflect upon, that “activity of attending 
to the general arrangements of a set of people whom chance or choice have brought 
together”; in other words, politics.
19
 Inevitably, politics is an activity undertaken by all 
communities of persons—“families, clubs, and learned societies”—but this “manner 




How are we to understand political activity within this relationship? Oakeshott’s 
invitation is to proceed, not by asking “what information we should equip ourselves 
with before we begin to be politically active”, but rather to “inquire into the kind of 
knowledge we unavoidably call upon whenever we are engaged in political activity”.
21
 
Political activity must be engaged in to be known. The suggestion is not that only 
politicians can know political activity; rather, “[w]ith us it is, at one level or another, a 
universal activity” even if, for many of us, it is a “secondary activity”.
22
 Like one’s 
native language, knowledge of political activity is acquired in the enjoyment of a 
tradition: “[w]e do not begin to learn our native language by learning words, but by 
learning words in use”.
23
 And just as the learning of a language cannot be said to have 
begun at a given moment or ever to be complete, “perhaps the only certainty” about 
how a tradition of behaviour is learned is that “there is no point at which learning can 




In these ways, Oakeshott’s invitation is to understand political activity as attending to 
the arrangements of a political community rather than as making those arrangements. 
To attend to arrangements is to be situated within an existing set of arrangements, to 
recognise how one is already in a context of political activity. To purport to make 
arrangements, on this understanding, is to attempt to set the stage before entering. This 
latter disposition is “ideological”: the claim to supply knowledge in advance of 
engaging in political activity. Those who profess an ideology suppose it to be “the 
product of intellectual premeditation” and, thinking their “body of principles” to be 
without debt to the activity of attending to the arrangements of their political 
community, they think themselves “able to determine and guide the direction of that 




Even those who profess to make are, in truth, attending to arrangements, albeit 
without sufficient care for or commitment to that tradition of which they are 
inescapably a part. At any point in time in a tradition of behaviour, “the new is an 
insignificant proportion of the whole”: even for the self-professed reformer who 
would destroy and rebuild rather than mend and amend, “the arrangements which are 
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enjoyed always far exceed those which are recognized to stand in need of attention”.
26
 
Those who promote an “ideology” and seek to bring political activity in line with its 
principles fail to realise how the “pedigree of every political ideology shows it to be 
the creature, not of premeditation in advance of political activity, but of meditation 




What of those great revolutionary moments like the French Declaration on the Rights 
of Man and of the Citizen of 1789? Therein one finds, “in a few sentences”, a political 
ideology: “a system of rights and duties, a scheme of ends—justice, freedom, equality, 
security, property, and the rest—ready and waiting to be put into practice for the first 
time”. “For the first time?”, asks Oakeshott. “Not a bit of it.”
28
 What of Locke’s 
Second Treatise of Government, read by revolutionaries as “a statement of abstract 
principles to be put into practice, regarded there as a preface to political activity”. A 
preface? No, answers Oakeshott: “so far from being a preface, it has all the marks of a 
postscript”.
29
 In both instances, the power of the written word is “derived from its 
roots in actual political experience”.
30
 For Oakeshott, “what we do, and moreover 





On this understanding, there is no alternative but to turn to the traditions of political 
activity and to commit oneself to knowing them. So why is politics—like every 
tradition of behaviour—a tricky thing to get to know? In short: because political 
activity is never settled. It is “neither fixed nor finished; it has no changeless centre to 
which understanding can anchor itself”, or, as Oakeshott would otherwise put it in 




Now, without more, this does not capture the practices of traditions of behaviour. As 
all practitioners of politics (of the family, the club, the society) know even if only 
unselfconsciously, a tradition of behaviour may be “flimsy and elusive” but, despite 
this, is not “without identity”.
33
 Political activity is “a possible object of knowledge” 
because, whilst no one part of a tradition is “immune from change” and all parts are 
liable to being otherwise, “all its parts do not change at the same time”.
34
 A tradition is 
never made in a moment, never created in an act, never founded—it is “diffused 
between past, present, and future; between the old, the new, and what is to come” and, 
with this studied ambiguity, one can say, without a hint of contradiction, that its 





To know a tradition is to see stability in its movement, to understand how it is “steady 
because, though it moves, it is never wholly in motion; and though it is tranquil, it is 
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31
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32
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35
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never wholly at rest”.
36
 This knowledge of political activity can be achieved only by 
understanding politics as an inheritance passed down and to be passed on, to see how 
the changes a tradition undergoes are potential within it. Everything within a tradition 
of behaviour “figures by comparison … not with what stands next to it, but with the 
whole” and, in this way, whilst everything is temporary, “nothing is arbitrary”.
37
 
Political activity is known, not as “an abstract idea, or a set of tricks, not even a 
ritual”, but rather as “a concrete, coherent manner of living”.
38
 In short, when 
understood as a manner of activity, politics is a tradition of behaviour—not the pursuit 
of desire or principle, but of intimations. 
 
4. Relationships of constitutional actors 
 
In responding to those who would find “some mystical qualities” in this account of 
tradition, Oakeshott confessed to being puzzled by the reaction: his account, as he 
understood it, was “an exceedingly matter-of-fact description of the characteristics of 
any tradition”, including the common law of England and the British constitution.
39
 
This analogy between the common law tradition and the British constitution is also 
drawn by Loughlin, who writes that “the British constitution is an extension of the 
methods of the common law”, in that the common law’s practical method is acquired 
“not by scholastic education but by apprenticeship to a pupil master” (at 21, 20). On 
this view, the constitution “is, at heart, an assemblage of customary practices, with the 
‘rules’ often amounting to no more than cribs distilled from such practices” (at 21).  
 
The British constitution’s traditions of behaviour are shaped by and expressed in the 
relationships of its various actors: the House of Commons to the House of Lords, the 
cabinet to the Prime Minister, the Queen to the cabinet and its chairman, the 
government to the opposition, the Leader of the Opposition to the parliamentary 
opposition, the backbenches to the frontbenches, the House committees to the House, 
the Ministers to the chamber, all of which, and more, are united in uncertain ways in 
the Palace of Westminster. But lest one think that the political activity that is the 
constitution is confined to this Palace, consider the relationship of Westminster to the 
administration in Whitehall, the relationship of them both to the seats of devolved 
governments in Holyrood, Cardiff, and Stormont, and the relationships of the Supreme 
Court of the United Kingdom to them all. For Loughlin, “British constitutional 
practice works by holding governmental institutions and practices in a relationship of 
mutual tension” (at 109). Understanding these relationships means understanding the 
tensions within them. 
 
In an effort to understand this commitment to exploring relationships historically and 
with an eye to their mutual tensions, consider the requirement that the government 
enjoy the confidence of the House of Commons. Public law scholars are quick to 
summarise this requirement as no more than the numerical support the majority party 
enjoys by definition. This fails to attend to the mutual tensions between the Commons 
and the government, tensions that a historical perspective helps illuminate. That 
historical perspective, for Loughlin, highlights how the “peculiar strength of 
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parliamentary government lies in the complexity and ambiguity of its institutional 
arrangements” (at 42). 
 
On Loughlin’s reading, the “practices of parliamentary government are products of a 
rich historical struggle between the crown and the communities of the realm” (at 43). 
That struggle did not cease with the 17th century constitutional settlement and it is 
significant that the parliamentary form managed to absorb the many permutations of 
that struggle since. For example, consider how the modern day cabinet began as the 
King’s Privy Council, developed to guide, if not to control the work of Parliament. 
After Parliament had successfully asserted itself within the mixed constitution as a 
necessary player for the enactment of laws, the Privy Council had to find a way to 
secure the ready agreement of parliamentarians. On Loughlin’s interpretation, “the 
most effective way of achieving this was to appoint parliamentary leaders as the 
king’s Ministers” (at 51). In time and without a change in form, the cabinet changed 
from the King’s Privy Council delegates in Parliament to Parliament’s delegates in the 
King’s Council, and a controlling committee at that. The Sovereign now chooses as 
ministers only they who the House of Commons will accept. As with so much within 
the practices of the British constitution, that which was created overtook its creator.  
 
The story of cabinet is true of the more encompassing story of Parliament: “having 
come into existence as an act of royal will, Parliament – by invoking the principle of 
popular sovereignty – now assumed the power of self-creation” (at 48). Once 
Parliament determined, by enactment, the line of royal succession, the power of self-
creation was complete. The modern day manifestation of the struggle between Crown 
and Parliament is captured by the tradition according to which Her Majesty’s 
government maintains office only so long as it enjoys the confidence of the Commons. 
That confidence is evaluated in the various ways in which the Commons scrutinise, 
regulate, frustrate, come into conflict with, and ultimately approve the cabinet’s 
policies. Confidence is measured, augmented, lessened and lost when the leader of the 
opposition spars with the leader of the government during Questions to the Prime 
Minister, when a select committee of the Commons critically reports on the 
departmental activities of the Secretary of State, and when a public bill committee 
amends and reports on a public bill. Parliament does not stand idly by as cabinet 
pursues the business of government; rather, having expressed confidence in the 
government following the Queen’s Speech, the chamber—and the official opposition 
especially—tests its confidence in government on a quotidian basis.  
 
True to Loughlin’s emphasis on “mutual tensions”, neither Commons nor government 
can be understood without the other and, when the confidence between them is lost, 
one or the other must go, and sometimes both: either the Commons calls for a new 
government (a practice now less current than in times prior
40
) or the government calls 
for a new Commons or, as happens from time to time, a new Commons calls for a new 
government. With secure support in the Commons, the government may be said to 
control the House whose function it is to control the government. But lest 
simplifications overtake understanding, such support is itself contingent on the 
government continuing to warrant confidence and, no matter how large the 
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government’s majority, the House of Commons will recognise, at two swords’ length 
from the seat of the Prime Minister, the Leader of Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition. 
The passage of government bills through the chambers and their committees, the 
government submission of estimates and financial debates, the questions—oral and 
written—replied to and not by government ministers, and the tabling of opposition 
and backbench motions each and all contribute to testing the Commons’ confidence in 
the cabinet. 
 
The many relationships of ministerial responsibility to Parliament—that tradition 
which gives expression to the ministry’s dependence on the continuing confidence of 
the Commons—cannot be completely captured in neat formulations, except by way of 
stating that “Ministers generally do or should do X in circumstances Y (but with 
various exceptions)”.
41
 What are the exceptions? They depend on the actors and the 
traditions of their relationships. If we state that the government resigns when it loses 
the confidence of the Commons, we must immediately add “except when it remains in 
office” (which it almost invariably does); so, too, in affirming that ministers must 
offer their resignations upon serious personal or departmental error must we add the 
qualification: “except when they retain their posts or are given peerages”.
42
 The 
exceptions vary over time and sometimes overtake the general proposition. To 
understand the constitution is to resist appeals to “simplicity and homogeneity, a sea 
without tides, seasons without variety” and to embrace the complexity of the practices 
of political activity that are heterogeneous, coherent and incoherent at once.
43
 None of 
this suggests that one is incapable of formulating precise, rule-like accounts of 
ministerial responsibility. The Ministerial Code issued by the Prime Minister to 
cabinet contains many such provisions, but the more important among them resist 
reducing the traditions of responsibility to settled rules. Consider the following: 
“Ministers of the Crown are expected to behave in a way that upholds the highest 
standards of propriety”; “When Parliament is in session, the most important 
announcements of Government policy should be made in the first instance, in 
Parliament”; “The principle of collective responsibility, save where it is explicitly set 
aside, applies to all Government Ministers”.
44
 Each proposition invites the exercise of 
judgment; each formulation is indebted to traditions of behaviour and, thus, is best 
understood by one who is familiar with such traditions.  
 
Consider a second relationship within Westminster: the Commons to the Lords. 
Whilst the composition of the House of Commons is transitory—changing with each 
general election—the membership of the upper house is comparatively steady and the 
continuity of the Lords has been exercised past and present to frustrate the initiatives 
of the Commons. Not finding a majority in the Lords, the Commons—through the 
government it selects—may seek the appointment of a majority, saying: “Use the 
powers of your House as we like, or you shall not use them at all”.
45
 With time, it 
came to be that the House of Lords, formally of near equal status and historically of 
far superior status to the House of Commons, assumed the role of a revising and 
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suspending chamber: revising and, at times, referring bills sent to it by the Commons 
back whence they came, but never standing in the way of a determined lower house. 
As Bagehot would capture the claim, the authority of the House of Lords came to be 
understood as no stronger than: “We reject your Bill for this once, or these twice, or 




When, in the early 1900s, the Lords did not stay true to its jurisdiction and denied the 
Commons its way on the finances of the realm, the Commons resolved that the defeat 
of the government’s Finance bill was “a breach of the constitution and an usurpation 
of the rights of the Commons”.
47
 The remedy proposed to correct this change in the 
practices of the constitution was to change the constitution again by providing that the 
Lords could no longer do otherwise than that which they had by practice done: to 
revise and suspend, but not block. Emboldened by a promise from George V to 
appoint sufficient numbers of new peers to overcome opposition in the upper 
chamber, the Commons asked the Lords to assent to a bill which would allow future 
bills to become Acts of Parliament without their assent, and they promptly complied.
48
 
After the Lords had changed the practices of the constitution by rejecting the Finance 
bill, the Commons replied by changing the practices again, so as better to align 
constitutional actors to the traditions of behaviour animating their relationship.  
 
In providing that a public bill could become an Act of Parliament without the assent of 
the House of Lords, did the Parliament Act 1911 amend the constitution? The lesson 
of traditions of behaviour is to offer a qualified reply. Whilst legislative changes are 
readily noticed by public lawyers, they tell but a small part of the history of the 
constitution, which is reforming itself everyday day, sometimes by statute, principally 
by practice. Having passed the Parliament Act, the fundamental question for the 
constitution remained: would it be used? In a sense, it had already been used to change 
the relationship between the two chambers: by its assent, the Lords explicitly 
consented to what had long been understood—that their status was inferior to the 
Commons. However, true to the lessons of traditions of behaviour, it is significant to 
note that the Act has been relied upon only seven times, including in 1949 to amend 
itself. Does this betray the simplified account according to which the Parliament Act 
1911 “removed the Lords’ veto”? Yes and no. Whilst it is true that, even when the 
Parliament Act is not employed, the Lords proceed on the understanding that it could, 
the 1911 Act did not preclude the need to develop the Salisbury convention (according 
to which the Lords will not defeat manifesto bills) or, indeed, the move to amend the 
Parliament Act in 1949. 
 
The relationships of the two chambers of Parliament are guided by the primacy of the 
Commons over the Lords and the judgment of the upper house to know when to resist 
and when not to. By a process of changing practices between the Houses of 
Parliament, the constitution has arrived at the “curious paradox” that an appointed 
House is able “to produce a revising chamber which simultaneously provides a greater 
measure of independent scrutiny of government than the House of Commons, without 
at the same time undermining the political supremacy of the House of Commons, or 
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5. Proposition and practice 
 
The British constitution has long been distinguished by the extent to which it rests on 
traditions of behaviour, traditions which may be said to be “more easily felt than 
analysed”.
50
 Consider how the House of Lords could force the House of Commons to 
rely on the Parliament Act before any bill it disagrees with becomes an Act of 
Parliament, but does not; how the opposition could introduce a motion of non-
confidence in Her Majesty’s Government at every opportunity, but does not; how the 
Queen could appoint as Prime Minister anyone of her choosing, but does not; how the 
Secretary of State could refuse to answer questions in the Commons, but does not. The 
uses of “could” in these preceding statements are receivable only when the 
relationships of the constitution are set out in propositional form. But when one 
attends to the constitution’s traditions of behaviour and the judgments of its various 
actors, such propositions fail to capture how the actors continue the practices inherited 
and to be passed on. Their judgment is situated within that which is already underway 




To know the constitution is to avoid reducing it to formulae: “knowledge of it is 
unavoidably knowledge of its details” and “to know only the gist is to know 
nothing”.
52
 The closest approximation to formulaic proposition is one that keeps 
traditions at the forefront of any reading of the constitution, as in the following 
accounts: 
 
1. The prerogatives of the Crown are exercised on the advice of 
Ministers (except in such cases as they are not). 
 
2. The Government resigns when it loses the confidence of the House 
of Commons (except when it remains in office). 
 
3. Ministers speak and vote together (except when they cannot agree 
to do so). 
 
4. Ministers explain their policy and provide information to the House 
(except when they keep it to themselves). 
 
5. Ministers offer their individual resignations if serious errors are 
made in their Departments (except when they retain their posts or are 
given peerages). 
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6. Every act of a civil servant is, legally speaking, the act of a Minister 




This tug-of-war between proposition and practice relates to what Oakeshott identified 
as the two sorts of knowledge involved in any practical activity: technical knowledge 
and practical knowledge.
54
 The former may be “formulated into rules which are, or 
may be, deliberately learned, remembered, and, as we say, put into practice”; its 
“chief characteristic is that it is susceptible of precise formulation”.
55
 Oakeshott gives 
the example of driving a motorcar, part of the technique of which is to be found in the 
Highway Code, just as “the technique of cookery is to be found in the cookery book, 
and the technique of discovery in natural science or in history is in their rules of 
research, of observation and verification”.
56
 One could add that the technique of the 
English language is to be found in books on English grammar and syntax. But just as 
one cannot learn to speak English, to discover, to cook, or to drive from a study of 
technical knowledge alone, so too can one not know the constitution by learning only 
the various formulae just outlined. For one will ask: “When does the exception hold?”, 
and formulaic replies are not always available. Here one must appeal to knowledge of 
tradition and see within that tradition the exercise of practical judgment by political 
actors. 
 
Practical knowledge “exists only in use, is not reflective and (unlike technique) cannot 
be formulated in rules”.
57
 It is shared and becomes common not by the “method of 
formulated doctrine”, but by being “imparted and acquired”, a form of apprenticeship 
dispersed between a past, the present, and what is to come.
58
 These traditions of 
behaviour are forever in motion and are distinguished by being temporary even as no 
change within them is arbitrary. Unlike the formulation of “rules, principles, 
directions, maxims”, which give the “appearance of certainty”, practical knowledge of 
“the done” and “the not done” things has the “appearance of imprecision” and of 




But it is not necessarily so. Traditions of behaviour are undertaken in concert with 
others and practical knowledge of what is intimated by such traditions is not reducible 
to the whim of the one, but only to the various activities of the many, never acting 
wholly in concert, sometimes acting in opposition to each other, but always attending 
to the same constitutional arrangements. The thought is well captured by saying that 
the “extent to which one can be unconventional depends upon the strength of the 
convention”, which is never determined only by the actor who would depart from it.
60
 
Any one of the many relationships of the constitution will change only so far as its 
participants will allow. The situated judgment of constitutional actors allows us to 
understand that what they do and aspire to do is itself a creature of how they already 
conduct their affairs and carry on the arrangements of the constitution. 
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Whilst technical and practical knowledge cannot be considered “identical with one 
another or able to take the place of one another”, neither—and “pre-eminently not in 
political activity”—can they be separated from one another.
61
 One cannot commit 
technique to formula without knowing the activity of which it is a part, nor can one 
read and comprehend the formulation of technique without knowing the activity to 
which it is to be “put into practice”. Nevertheless, in keeping the different sorts of 
knowledge alive in one’s reading of the British constitution, one may interpret what 
Griffith was saying when he expressed the unsettling idea that the “constitution of the 
United Kingdom lives on, changing from day to day for the constitution is no more 
and no less than what happens. Everything that happens is constitutional. And if 
nothing happened that would be constitutional also”.
62
 When read as a formulation of 
technical knowledge (as many have read Griffith), it reduces the constitution to 
nothing: the technique of the constitution is the absence of technique, the mere 
happening (or not) of events. But when read as an expression (not a formulation) of 
practical knowledge, as a grasping at the practices of the constitution, one reads 
Griffith as appealing to traditions of behaviour, a difficult thing to get to know, one 
marked by continuity and change. Understood in this way, whilst everything that 
happens is constitutional, “not just anything can happen”.
63
 The judgment of political 
actors attending to the arrangements of the constitution is bounded by the tradition 
they carry on. This tradition, whilst flimsy and arbitrary to the untrained eye, is for the 
participants the arbitrator of “the done” and “the not done” things. 
 
In reflecting on “ordinary constitutional practice in Britain”, Lord Bingham explained 
how, under the British constitution, “matters of potentially great importance are left to 
the judgment either of political leaders … or, even if to a diminished extent, of the 
crown”, thus allowing for “a flexible response to differing and unpredictable 
events”.
64
 This judgment is acquired in the practical art of governing; that is, through 
experience. It calls upon a pragmatic disposition and fixation, a matter-of-fact sense of 
what can and cannot be done given what has and has not been done. The political 
activity of the British constitution is diffused between the various relationships that 
give it shape, between being temporary and continuous, and between the exercise of 
judgment to maintain or change—all the while attending to—the arrangements of the 
constitution. The various actors of the constitution exercise judgment to continue 
traditions of political activity in the absence of the strictures of a constitutional court 
or written instrument with the stipulated status and force of supreme positive law. In 
this sense, one can follow Blackstone in understanding members of Parliament as “the 
guardians of the English Constitution”,
65
 so long as we add: together with the various 
other constitutional actors.  
 
This is a rich sense of constitution, one that Loughlin seeks to articulate. In so doing, 
he offers his reader a constant reminder that this is a sense of constitution that is 
waning. The traditions of behaviour that carried the constitution from absolute 
monarchical rule to democratic and representative parliamentary government and 
from a Kingdom United and far-reaching to independence for former colonies, 
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devolution and membership in the European Union are no longer viable. “Unsure of 
our customs”, reports Loughlin, “we have been obliged to write down more and more 
of these practices in rules and regulations” (at 107). The question put by Loughlin (at 
108) is existential: “Are we now at the stage at which customary practices are unable 
any longer to determine present behaviour or guide future conduct?”  
 
6. Loss of tradition 
 
If Loughlin is correct that, in the traditional understanding, “the better the constitution 
the fewer the written constitutional laws” (at 9), there is reason to suspect that 
traditions of behaviour are no longer being carried forth in the Brtish constitution. 
Attempts to commit constitutional practice to written form disclose “a mode of 
conduct that has not been fully absorbed in the manners, traditions, and practices of a 
people” (at 9). The rise in such attempts of late suggests a dire diagnosis for the state 
of Britain’s constitution of tradition.  
 
In October 2011, the Cabinet Office published The Cabinet Manual: A guide to laws, 
conventions and rules on the operation of government, said by the Prime Minister to 
set “out the internal rules and procedures under which the Government operates” and 
to serve as “an authoritative guide for ministers and officials”.
66
 The Cabinet Manual 
follows the promulgation of the Civil Service Code (1996), the Ministerial Code (first 
issued in 1992 as Questions of Procedure for Ministers), the Constitutional Reform 
Act 2005 and its distrust of traditions of behaviour surrounding the office of Lord 
Chancellor, the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 and its codification 
of traditions surrounding the role of Parliament in the ratification of treaties, and the 
Fixed-Term Parliaments Act 2011 and the elimination of the Prime Minister’s 
discretion in timing general elections. To this selective list of formal enactments could 
be added the impatience of parliamentary committees with ministerial prerogative 
powers and the privileges of both Houses.
67
 If Loughlin is right that the better the 
constitution the fewer the written constitutional laws, this commitment to writing 
Britain’s constitutional traditions into law sustains his view that many, including many 
constitutional actors, now find the idea of a constitution of tradition “rather puzzling” 
(at 1).  
 
Not only are the constitution’s traditions being committed to writing, they are being—
in breach of longstanding practice—labelled “constitutional”. In the past, “whenever it 
has sought to change constitutional arrangements Parliament has done so indirectly 
and in purely technical language, such as in the Representation of the People Acts or 
the Parliament Acts” (at 115). Today, “we encounter legislation that explicitly states 
its intention to ‘reform the constitution’” (at 115), as do the 2005 and 2010 Acts just 
referenced. Loughlin’s conclusion seems inevitable: “the entire political class seems 
to have lost faith in customary ways of government” (at 4). Instead of carrying on a 
tradition of behaviour inherited from their predecessors, constitutional actors have set 
out to reconstruct the constitution and, in so doing, have left behind the idea that the 
British constitution could be one wherein “the done” and “the not done” things are 
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identified by reference to traditions of behaviour and the tacit understandings inherent 
in them. “Today”, reports Loughlin, “the problem is not confined to grasping the 
meaning of these tacit understandings of the constitution: the question is whether they 
can be said still to exist” (at 1).  
 
The book’s final pages confront the question with which we began: “does Britain 
possess a constitution?” The answer offered is subtle. On the one hand, the 
“traditional idea of a constitution which the British have long celebrated has become 
so corroded that it no longer provides a coherent account of the nature of British 
government” (at 116). Britain can no longer confidently be said to define its 
constitution in part by the activity of its constitutional actors. On the other hand, it 
cannot be confidently said that Britain possesses a constitution of the modern type: 
written, codified, and dignified with the status of supreme positive law. Although 
many tacit understandings have been committed to writing, many traditions of 
behaviour reformed in law, many relationships between actors re-regulated by rules, 
the exercise has been “undertaken in a thoroughly British manner: rather than starting 
afresh, we are creating a modern-style constitution in an incremental and pragmatic 
fashion” (at 118). 
 
The storyline of Loughlin’s constitutional account might well have ended here, 
suggesting that the inevitable will come: Britain’s constitution of tradition will 
whither and eventually be replaced, in every respect, by a modern constitution 
guarded by a constitutional court. And yet, in his interpretation of the present state of 
constitution malaise, Loughlin suggests the possible persistence of the constitution of 
tradition and warns of the dangers of thinking that it can be done away with.  
 
De Gaulle’s appeal to the “general consent” to explain the success of the British 
constitution over its long history was contrasted with “meticulously worked out 
constitutional texts”. The lesson offered by the French since their revolution of 1789 is 
that no matter how meticulous the text of one’s constitution, it cannot survive without 
some measure of general consent. Loughlin appeals to something similar in recalling 
that “drafting and adopting such a modern constitution does not make it a living 
reality” (at 12). The challenge ahead for the constitutional reformers is therefore great: 
can the constitution’s traditions of behaviour be reformed without losing the “general 
consent” which sustained them and which must sustain the new constitutional 
arrangements? Loughlin’s diagnosis is not promising: “the process of converting the 
informal practices of British government into formal rules … does not signal the 
emergence of a new constitution”; rather, it “marks the extent to which the old 
constitution has lost its guiding spirit and must now be shored up by formal rules” (at 
41). But what will give those formal rules their authority? The absence of a ready 
answer to this question is what allows Loughlin to affirm that whilst “the old is 
dead; the new is yet to be born” (at 41). We are, without doubt, in a period of 
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serve as “the perfect introduction to subjects you previously knew nothing about”.
68
 
Martin Loughlin’s The British Constitution: A Very Short Introduction speaks to both 
audiences: to the students of the constitution, he provides a historically rich 
introduction to the rise and fall of the British constitution of tradition; to scholars of 
the constitution, he provides a welcome challenge to those who would accelerate the 
modernisation of the constitution and who fail to see how political activity can be 
more than either unbounded by the absence of or constrained by the presence of a 
constitution. To recall the theme with which this essay began, Loughlin has defended 
an understanding of political activity as not quite without or within but as the British 
constitution of tradition. 
 
For the British constitution, there is no single, identifiable moment of constitution-
making akin to a founding. The constitution is made every day, in the sense of being 
attended to, engaged with, mended and developed as its traditions of behaviour are 
carried on and whiter. Alexis de Tocqueville concluded from the practice according to 
which “the constitution may change continually” that, therefore, “it does not in reality 
exist”,
69
 a sentiment echoed years earlier by Thomas Paine in affirming that “the 
continual use of the word constitution in the English parliament shows there is 
none”.
70
 These indictments assume too much: no constitution is self-enforcing and the 
success of written constitutions rests not on “parchment barriers” but on a 
commitment and standing tradition to live according to their terms. That commitment 
and standing tradition serve as a ready reminder that the constitution will always be 
more than the modernisers would have it be. It will always, even if imperfectly, be 
indebted to a critically reflective understanding of “the done” and “the not done” 
things. 
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